Against Liverpool, Arsenal lost midfield control and lacked centrality. The midfield duo of Lokonga-Partey were easily subdued by Liverpool’s midfield three and on occasion, by a forward who would drop in between the lines. This match once again highlighted Arsenal’s need to transition to a 3-man midfield in order to continually compete at the highest level.
Since Emile Smith-Rowe’s introduction in the 2020/2021 season against Chelsea, Mikel Arteta has utilized a 4-2-3-1 system that has enabled Arsenal to be amongst the top Premier League sides in terms of points won. With a balanced midfield pairing of Granit Xhaka and Thomas Partey at its heart, the system is stable and effective. However, it is interesting to note that many of the best teams in the world do not employ a 4-2-3-1 (with Bayern Munich a notable exception). Manchester City and Liverpool both employ a 4-3-3. Mikel Arteta also wants to move permanently to a 4-3-3. But why the 4-3-3? Let’s take a closer look.
Set formations in football are largely irrelevant. Teams often shift shapes depending on the phase of the game. Most teams use a 4-4-2 when defending in a block but do not keep the same shape when they attack. So why is the 4-3-3 of any relevance tactically?
Well, it’s quite simple. The 4-3-3 allows you to put as many true attackers as possible on the pitch. Instead of two #6’s, you have one #6 and two #8s – essentially, instead of Xhaka and Partey with just one of Smith-Rowe or Odegaard in front of them, you can have Partey as the base player with both Odegaard and Smith-Rowe in front of him at the same time. This means that if your goal is to dominate with the ball, the 4-3-3 is the best way to facilitate this simply because of the profiles of the players it can support..
Another advantage of the 4-3-3 over most other set formations is that it enables natural triangles all over the pitch. The existence of these natural triangles leads to easier rotations and fluidity (keyword being ‘easier’). With players who are comfortable operating in different zones of the pitch, the 4-3-3 allows you to create smooth positional interchanges. If all of that sounds good, what then is the problem?
Speaking to Dazn Spain earlier on, Arteta explained it: “For me, the way we occupy space and who is going to move in there is more important than the formation. And from there we have some very similar players that are not used to playing in those positions so we have to keep changing the formation a little bit. We want to move to a 4-3-3 but for that, you need a lot of specificity in every position but now in five or six positions, we don’t have it.”
Specificity is important to play a 4-3-3. The #6 in a 4-3-3 for instance is usually a dominant lighthouse that acts as a sort of fulcrum in possession and can read and prevent/delay counters once the opposition gets the ball. Steven Nzonzi, Sergio Busquets, Fabinho, Casemiro, Aurelin Tchouameni and Declan Rice are examples. This #6 is almost like having an extra centre-back, affording the team the ability to take more risks pushing upwards. In a 4-2-3-1, the two 6s are usually different: they can be less defensively dominant.
As seen against Burnley, Crystal Palace and Norwich, our players are not yet able to play the 4-3-3 to a high level. For instance, the lone #6 in the 4-3-3 has to be very careful with the ball in possession as there is less protection if the opposition wins it from him. This requires great maturity, simplicity and discipline with the ball. Thomas Partey, an all-action virtuoso, is a little bit not at ease with these requirements. He has always had the freedom to move the ball up the pitch at will. Now that he is asked to be risk-averse and be more statesman-like with the ball, there’s a necessary adjustment required (which I believe he’s capable of).
The issues do not end there. The two other midfielders in a 4-3-3 are required to track back and work hard when the team does not have the ball. This is very important. If they don’t do that work, then all the burden will fall on the lone #6 who will usually be left with an impossible task. Against Crystal Palace, Martin Odegaard was derelict in this duty. He was lacking in defensive scenarios, hid from physical duels and didn’t stay in the right places. This allowed Crystal Palace to exert easy control over the game. Conor Gallagher in particular was able to impose himself easily.
The 4-3-3 holds incredible potential for our young, versatile team. It allows us to fill the team with as many technical stars as possible, which helps to break teams down. It intrinsically provides centrality, which we struggle with. It is also the set formation that gives us the most chances of playing for academy prospects as well as potential incoming (you need a minimum of 6 midfielders to cover 3 positions). At one point or the other, we have to eventually be recognized as a 4-3-3 side.
That said, it is vital to realize tactical progress is not the only important thing for us this season. Achieving European football is a major goal, very plausible and will be a major boost for the project. To achieve European football, we need points. And our naivety in the 4-3-3 can cause us to lose points against sides we can pick points from. It cost us versus Crystal Palace and almost cost us versus Burnley.
This would all not be an issue if we were unable to achieve European football. Tactical progress in place for next season would have been a priority. But we already have a stable system that produces points at a sustainable, European-qualifying rate. It would be a dismal lack of priority to focus on achieving tactical progress in the 4-3-3 above achieving Europe.
If we achieve Europe, we will be able to recruit better than otherwise. This would in turn help our transition to the 4-3-3 permanently. Europe is possible. That should take precedence over every other thing. Arteta must stick with the 4-2-3-1 for now. Get the points on board and get into Europe. The 4-3-3 can always wait.